|
|
|
|
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) recognizes that the industrialized countries are responsible for a major part of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases, and they must therefore take the lead in making commitments to reduce their emissions. It also recognizes that developing countries |
Cumulative Carbon Dioxide emissions, 1950-95
Source:World Resources Institute (www.wri.org) |
|
need to develop, and as their economies grow so will their GHG emissions. The developing countries are therefore not required to make any emission reduction commitments for now. The developing countries, however, have several
concerns about the environmental and equity objectives of the
flexibility mechanisms that the Convention provides the industrialized
countries with to meet their commitments. Some of these concerns are:
While the flexibility mechanisms seek to provide the greatest economic efficiency in GHG abatement efforts, they may in fact not always to the objective of the convention—slowing climate change. Several analysts recognize that the flexibility mechanisms for emission trading primarily seek to provide greatest economic efficiency in GHG abatement efforts (1, 2, 3). Although all countries have both cheap and expensive options, by and large the inefficient technologies and prevailing economic structures of the developing countries provide much greater reductions for a unit of investment than could be achieved by the industrialized countries at home (1). According to one tentative estimate, abatement of one tonne of carbon would cost US $ 25 in India, $ 175 in USA, and $ 400 in a more energy efficient country like Japan (4). The Centre for Science and Environment, a Delhi-based policy research and advocacy NGO, argues that by focusing on cheap options, the mechanisms overlook ecological efficiency and effectiveness which would lead to achieving the ultimate objective of the Convention--namely, climate change mitigation. They argue that climate change and its impacts can be kept to a minimum only if a transition is made to zero-carbon energy options as rapidly as possible. As most of the low-cost options for GHG abatement are in the carbon energy sector, those are the options that industrialized countries will want to use, thereby locking the developing countries into the carbon energy system. They ask that the flexibility mechanisms should primarily support demand side management and renewable energy projects that promote the zero-carbon system (3). Selling emission rights for short-term benefit may lead to a compromise of their long-term economic growth and development. In the early phase of emissions trading developing countries might compete with each other to offer the cheapest options (5). While the industrialized countries may bank the credits for future use, the developing countries will probably be forced to buy costlier credits in the future. When they might have to meet emission targets of their own (6). By the time developing countries are required to make commitments, the cheaper options available there would all have been used up. The industrialized countries would then no longer be interested in investing or trading in emissions credits and would turn attention to achieving targets through domestic action (3). Developing countries have been therefore calling for a ceiling on the proportion of commitments that can be met through trading. The European Union has suggested meeting commitment targets with at least 50 per cent domestic action (7, 8). Because the modalities of CDM are as yet unclear, developing countries are concerned about who will own the emission reduction units accruing from CDM projects, and whether the government or private entities would be allowed to keep a part to sell in the market. It has been suggested that developing country governments could acquire credits by levying an endorsement "tax" (9, 10). The idea of a South - South cooperative CDM projects has also been proposed (10). Most developing countries believe it is unfair of developed countries to ask them to make voluntary commitments to reduce emissions. Per capita CO2 emissions for 15 countries
Source: World Resources Institute (www.wri.org)
Under the Convention no commitments are required of developing countries in recognition of their need for development. The US, however, has been unwilling to make binding emission reduction commitments unless developing countries with large, rapidly growing economies, such as India and China, make voluntary commitments to reduce their emissions. Most developing countries are unwilling to comply. They argue that commitments that are in any way "required" cannot be called "voluntary". Even without making binding or voluntary commitments, countries such as India claim that they are already involved in activities aimed at climate change mitigation. These include measures such as improvement in energy efficiency, energy conservation, development of renewable energy sources and technologies, and population control (11, 12). To overcome many of these concerns the developing countries, particularly India and China, have been recommending a per capita approach to emission entitlement. They claim that every human being has an equal right to the global atmosphere. At present an American adds as much carbon to the atmosphere as 19 Indians or 269 Nepalis (13). They have suggested that the amount of carbon emissions considered safe should be divided equally among all people of the world. One advantage of an early decision on per capita entitlements would be that the developing countries would join the formal process emissions abatement sooner. Their participation in a system of entitlements which permits trading of the unused portion would provide developing countries with an incentive to move towards a low emissions developmental path and would make them wary of allowing high GHG-emitting activities. It has been argued that per capita entitlements would be unfair to countries with stable populations, and that they would provide countries a perverse incentive to increase their population. However, the solution to that problem could be the freezing of the global population distribution with reference to an agreed year beyond which per capita entitlements would go down if population goes up (3). Some analysts believe that to achieve the aim of the Convention following the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities, convergence of per capita emissions of industrialized and developing countries would have to be achieved in the long run within the corridor of sustainability, or the "convergence corridor" (14, 15).
|
|
